

AG lit. review questions: week 5

The puzzle of IE

(Q1) What is the ‘puzzle of indefinite extensibility’, as Warren sees it?

(Q2) Warren writes:

If the concept of set, for example, is indefinitely extensible, then we cannot quantify over absolutely all of the sets and so, a fortiori, we cannot quantify over absolutely everything. This inference can be challenged, but it is quite natural. (QVIE, 82)

How might we challenge this inference?

Quantifier pluralism

(Q3) How should we distinguish metasemantics from semantics?

(Q4) What’s the difference between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches to metasemantics?

(Q5) What is quantifier inferentialism? How does it differ from conceptual role semantics?

(Q6) How does quantifier deflationism differ from quantifier pluralism?

(Q7) How do Warren’s metasemantic views differ from Putnam’s or Hirsch’s?

Collapse

(Q8) What, according to Warren, does it take for a quantifier to be unrestricted?

(Q9) How does he propose to avoid Harris-style collapse objections?

(Q10) Does he succeed?

The puzzle of IE again

(Q11) How does Warren propose to solve the puzzle of IE?

(Q12) Is his solution convincing?

Objections

(Q13) Does running through e.g. Russell's paradox *really* change the meaning of our quantifiers?

(Q14) Does this view amount to set-theoretic creationism?

(Q15) Warren writes:

It might be thought odd, or even inconsistent, that I claimed both (a) that ' \forall ' in L was unrestricted and (b) from the perspective of $L+$, ' \forall ' in L is a restriction of ' \forall ' in $L+$. But the incoherence here is only apparent

Does he successfully dispense with the oddness or incoherence?

(Q16) Does Warren's view face revenge worries involving 'superquantifiers'?